Archive: Business Model

Monetization or Reach – Discussion [German]

In seinem Media-Blog greift Frank Huber meinen Post zum Thema Monetarisierung auf.

und widerspricht meinen Ansichten mit zwei Begründungen: YouTube habe gezeigt, “size does matter” und sevenload verfolge ja nicht einmal die von mir empfohlene Strategie. Inhaltlich habe ich folgende Antworten:

1) Es ist zweifellos richtig, dass für den “natürlichen Marktführer”, der als erster auf Reichweite setzt, das Spiel aufgehen kann. Auf den Fall YouTube gehe ich ja selbst in meinem Post ein. Ich warne nur davor, die Transaktion von YouTube, die tatsächlich ex post durch die Marktmacht von Google zu einem sinnvollen Investment noch werden kann, als replizierbare Strategie zu beschreiben. Es gibt immer weltweit oder www-weit genau ein Unternehmen pro segment, dem dies als Exit gelingt. Hardly good general advice for startups.

Mein Argument war ja auch nicht, dass Reichweite oder die Anzahl an Nutzern oder Kunden, die man gewinnt, unerheblich sind – im Gegenteil. Ich denke nur, das es gesünder ist, diese Reichweite oder Kundenbasis mit einerm funktionierenden Business Modell zu erreichen als ohne. Ein gutes Beispiel Dafür ist übrigens XING. Lars hat schon am ersten Tag in 2003 5,- € monatliche Mitgliedschaftsgebühr verlangt, als Abo-Modelle noch in verruf waren.

2) Unsere Strategie bei sevenload ist genau nicht die einer Brutto-Reichweitensteigerung um jeden Preis. Wir verfolgen den Ansatz, aus rein organischem Wachstum (bislang nicht ein € für Werbung) die am besten differenzierte Plattform zu bieten und den “Long Tail” of content abzudecken. Dies führt dazu, dass wir für Werbekunden um einen Faktor 10 wertvoller sind als alle anderen videoportale und sogar als die meisten herkömmlichen Internet-Portale – gemessen an unseren Werbepreisen. Mit dieser Differenzierung sind wir heute Marktführer nach Unique Visitors (> 10 Mio echte Uniques pro Monat), aktiven registrierten Nutzern (> 300.000), Verweildauern (> 25 Min pro visit, bei registrierten Nutzern > 45 Min), Content-Menge und Einnahmen (wir werden das umsatzstärkste Web 2.0 Unternehmen in Deutschland in diesem Jahr und voraussichtlich das einzige, das profitabel ist. Wir erreichen dies durch ein Werbemodell, das überdurchschnittlich wirksam ist.

Interessanterweise hat diese Strategie zu einer nachhaltigen Steigerung unserer Brutto-Reichweite geführt, so dass wir inzwischen Platz zwei der deutschen Plattformen noch vor Clipfish belegen.

Ich würde also wagen zu behaupten, dass im Gegensatz zu dem Eindruck, den wir zumindest hier zu erwecken scheinen, der Lehrsatz von Al Ries:

Create a new category, then dominate it

immer noch der beste Rat ist. Mein Post sollte einen kleinen Beitrag zu einer Methode hierzu leisten.

IPTV, Digital TV, and Web 2.0: Power to the Audience [English]

Technical, economic and social developments, which are only inadequately described by IPTV, Web TV, Digital Special Interest Channels, and Web 2.0, are leading a fundamental structural change in the relationship between consumers/viewers and providers.

Until now, the value creation of television was geared towards offering content in order to gain the highest viewer attention percentage possible and to market a portion of this attention through advertising formats (e.g. TV commercials). As long as there were only a few TV stations available, this was a successful business model.

Today however, the viewer has the power to decide when and which media content he “consumes”. He/she can actively suppress advertising, zap or click to any media environment he prefers. At the same time, technology enables active navigation of media content, empowering the user even more:

- search,

- On-Demand streaming and download,

- and interactivity of content

These navigation tools offer viewers and consumers a completely new dimension of content relevance. The future belongs to

“Long Tail” specific, on-demand offerings, with context-relevant services and interactive ad formats that are targeted and relevant

These enhanced “program formats” are increasingly determined and – even outside the context of User Generated Content – “coproduced” by the users in increasingly differentiated clusters. This is the priciple that unifies the various new approaches from YouTube to Joost to sevenload.

Monetization or Reach?

In a recent discussion I had at a meeting of which I am a non-executive member, the eternal discussion of

whether priority should be given to monetization or to reach and internationalization

was brought up. The debate centered around the question of whether or not the exit perspectives of the venture (of which I am also a shareholder) would increase or decrease, depending on whether the business model was first proven, at the detriment of international reach, or whether monetization should be allowed to lag because entry into several international markets at once would be a priority.

To me, this debate simply has the wrong starting point. While it is true that exit markets, such as the stock market or the M&A market, are – just like any other market – subject to buyer preference analysis, and while there is some credit to the claim that understanding the decision making “fashions” of typical M&A acquirers does help you in setting the price of your venture at exit,

timing towards such an exit market is more of a gamble than a company strategy.

In my experience, having now gone through two boom and one bust phases, the best strategy for a company to pursue is to

create a viable business model that creates value for customers that customers are prepared to pay for.

This may not always be the “sexiest” portrayal a startup can give itself (as opposed to: we are the next Facebook), but to paraphrase the old saying about design following function or form following function-

PR and the Elevator Pitch should follow the strategy and not the other way around.

This is why I literally get angry at classic venture capital thinking that sees company strategy solely in the dimension of “How will this fit my exit market? How can I sell this story to an acquirer?”. I would always strongly advise any founder

to have a clear and separate vision of their business model that cannot be influenced or swayed, save by the customer

and to work relentlessly on proving and creating that.

Incidentally, succesful American start-ups have often proven that this is the best strategy since they have always focused on gaining size and growth in their home markets before over-focussing on internationalization. In general, this has given them the size and clout necessary to, if need be, acquire whoever it was in a landscape within a specific market. It is true, that this does not always work and that some local markets have been lost even for giants such as Yahoo! and E-bay because they haven’t gone local on time, but conversely there is no known example of a company that went for reach without a viable business model and survived.

Eventually, you do have to pay the bills.

So if you do have to reach several international markets at once (because you are in a European market with too small a home market or because your board is adamant or because you have that peculiar megalomania that most entrepreneurs – including me – indulge in, I would advise the following order or priorities in formulating your company strategy:

1) Define your Business Model

2) Prove it by acquiring your reference customer base

3) Identify the growth factors in your business model with respect to paying customers

4) Identify the multipliers or incumbents in other international markets

5) Internationalize on a sales / business model driven basis by acquiring reference paying customers in those markets

The perceptions of your target exit markets can change faster than you can change the positioning of your company.

But a functioning business model and a continuous revenue stream are two realities that a) always let your survive independently of your VC backing and b) always find an acquirer.

Where there is a business model, there always eventually is an exit market.

Viral Social Commerce for Companies

In my previous post, I tried to describe what I call viral social commerce as the commercial dimension to Web 2.0. This Blog entry will focus on the opportunities and strategic demands that viral social commerce presents to existing companies- especially such companies that have a dominant position in their market. If viral social commerce describes an increasingly commercial nature to the interaction presented by users on the web, then this has deep implications for a relationship between companies and their customers.

On the communication level, much has already been written about the need for companies to go from a broadcast model to an interactive/interaction model, and many companies have already experimented with blogging, viral marketing and other forms of “Web 2.0 marketing”. So far, these endeavors have been met with mixed success. This has a number of reasons- which I will try to sum up in 3 axioms:

1) A day still has only 24 hrs, and our wallets have not gotten fatter.

What this means, is that for all the novelty and increased value in communication that Web 2.0 methods can create in their relationship between customers and companies, engaging in these for more than a fleeting moment of curiosity will require any customer to make a sacrifice of both time and effort to the detriment of something else they’d rather be doing. What this means is that you need axiom number 2.

2) Real people seek real value.

Axiom number 2 is probably the central answer to any strategic or implementation question connected to any type of new technology. Technologies do not usually fail because of technical questions, in fact, the success of technologies is often independent of the quality of the technology involved or its implementation- in other words, abject products are sometimes more successful than perfect technologies (the old, if not entirely true, Microsoft – Apple adage).

Technologies do fail however, when they do not meet a market in a way that creates significant value for a significant value for a significant segment of potential customers. This is the Holy Grail of start-up and business success and it has often been described and is easily worded, but hard to execute.

So cutting back on Web 2.0 technology by seeking not a mash-up of all the functionalities that happen to be the talk of the town and instead looking for ways to create real value with Web 2.0 technologies requires, first, an analysis not of Web 2.0, of these technologies or even of the Web 2.0 early adopter crowd. Much rather, it requires a thorough analysis of the existing market, existing distribution communication channels in those markets and existing or potential customer segments. Then and only then, but then with the strongest impact, can the potential, use and value of a specific Web 2.0 technology be found. This is where competitive advantages are born. This leads me to axiom number 3.

3) Innovation begins with a thorough understanding of the existing weaknesses of the existing market.

This attitude best summarized and methodized in the book Blue Ocean Strategy by Chan Kim and Renee Mauborgne. This approach is at the core of most technological successes and I am more than certain that in the existing wave of new start-ups, those start-ups will succeed which have best understood this lesson.

For companies in existing markets, this means that hunting for the weaknesses of their own methods of communication, of production and sourcing, and of other interaction (for example, service interaction with their customers) and then hunting for solutions to these weaknesses which were before impossible, but can now be enabled by Web 2.0 technologies, is the key to success.

You may find that direct communication with customers or sourcing in of product or feature feedback from customers was, until now, on a snail mail or even E-mail or call center paradigm, impossible to manage efficiently and to link back to the production and design process for some products. In the environment of a web 2.0 community and / or user to user communication interface, this sourcing process, suddenly becomes manageable because of the combination of ratings, feedback and systematic analysis in a technology-enabled low-cost framework. At the very least, such a platform will bind your most active customers.

The task of sifting through all the feedback and identifying the most valuable feedback from customers now does not have to be preformed by the organization alone, but can be delegated at least in part to the community- and this can apply to almost any market.

In the following model, I’ve tried to sum up the paradigm shift that this entails for companies in existing markets. Until now, you had the classic paradigm of production and product identification followed by (retail) marketing and distribution, and the cherry on the top was communicating to customers through combined PR and advertising.

Viral Social Commerce Model

On all levels of that process, a redefinition can now take place by including interaction with customers. At the very least, the communication/advertising end of the classic model of value creation within the business organization can undergo a paradigm shift from communication to interaction that links back into the organization. This is exemplified in the drawing below- and creates a whole new set of requirements for the company including, for example, new tracking tools, new analysis tools and a new mindset in marketing. Marketing then becomes not just a communication task but becomes much more a framework for the company’s role as the

host of a community of customers.

These are the concepts that we’ve been working on for years now at denkwerk and which we try to reflect in our everyday work for our clients, such as Nokia, Obi and other retail giants. This paradigm shift leads to surprising successes each time the department of the company we are working with and we are mandated to not only think, but also act in a radically different way.

“Quo diata Diferenta”??- as Guy Kawasaki puts it.

Viral Social Commerce

These past months have, in a way that I would not have thought possible, created a start-up market situation closely resembling a certain period in time that we had in 1999. A number of new start-ups have sprung up that stem from what I call “feature-itis”, that is: their main business idea is not the creation of a value that addresses a particular market in a way that is commercially feasible, but much more the “hey- wouldn’t it be cool if it were possible to do this or that on the web” impulse.

If you sift through the business history of the first and second wave of the internet and try to analyze which companies ended up being successful, which companies were moped up as additional features to Yahoo! and bought out, and which companies simply failed, you find out that at the end of the day it’s not at all about a new economy, it’s about very old principles of

– servicing viable markets
- with a viable market proposition/value proposition
- and at an affordable price

in the widest sense of price, that is: convenience, access, time, budget and eventually price in dollars.

If we now look at what I like to call Web 3.0, that is, the commercial maturity of the social phenomena that we are observing with Web 2.0, then remembering that business history and applying the method of identifying customers for a market that are prepared to pay a given price, is a healthy mental exercise.

You’ll allow me to refer to myself and my earlier Blog entry about the distinction between Web 1.0, Web 2.0 and Web 3.0 and briefly describe Web 2.0 as the discovery that the internet is not only a repository for information and data, and a network through which e-mail and chat communication can happen, but has become a medium where

the human source of information

and human source of opinion and entertainment becomes as accessible as the data that he/she has created, that is at the core of the Web 2.0 social revolution. And as any revolution, it creates a whole new set of social behavioural changes, business opportunities, political implications and essentially an entirely new medium- which incidentally is not only confined to the Blog or Social Network phenomenon.

Stating these now commonplace insights into Web 2.0 leads me to reflect upon the Web 3.0 phenomenon, that is the commercial viability of all of these changes. As described in my Blog entry, I believe strongly that this will be the era where the source of data and information, and essentially this means the

human individual as a source of expertise,

can more and more market that expertise in many different ways- either

- by being accessible as an expert or
- by offering more in depth information or
- services related to the information
- transactions / products related to the information

for any kind of currency (this may be a social reward or a commercial reward/payment) in a variety of models that can range from subscription to micro-payments or even other forms of transaction that we may not yet even imagine (my informed hunch is “subscription” will mean many different rental models that are being imagined right now). As of now, the main focus of business endeavour in the Web 2.0 to Web 3.0 transition era, is to create and monetize exactly these kinds of platforms- much in the way that sevenload is doing for the video world.

In the future, business focus will be to harness the technologies, communication methods and social behaviour of Web 3.0 to create new value and new markets, thereby disrupting existing business structures. Increasingly, this will be achieved by individuals and small companies rather than larger companies.

The challenge is to identify these markets beyond advertising. If we look at what is happening right now in the Web 2.0 sphere, it is essentially one giant cannibalization of the editorial market, trying to supplement old media and replace them with “Facebook-”, “MySpace-”, and “YouTube-” (new) models of broad- and selfcasting and interaction with the user. That will, of course, be successful, but it is hardly imaginable that more than a productivity or effiency increase of more than 25-35% (maybe even 40% or 50% through better targeting) with relation to the advertising market can be sustained.

Even more market volume may be created by opening the advertising market to new segments that, until now, had a high cost barrier towards advertising, for example in the Long Tail of smaller and mid-sized companies, or in niche markets which had to rely on direct marketing because there was no medium for them to address at sales efficient cost on a large scale.

This disruption of the advertising marjet is of course fueled by the radically changed cost-dynamics of Web 2.0 platforms and the possibility to address the long-tail of content and offering highly specific audiences to as specific advertisers.

This opening of niche markets for advertising may one day – probably soon to come – come as far as user groups and communities centered around exotic topics such as the nuts and bolts of drilling joints (or something similar).

But by and all, if advertising is the only focus of what is happening right now, there will inevitably be a crunch at the moment of realization that there is just not enough money in these markets to create hundreds of new billion dollar companies. Even though a return to the Nuclear Winter of The Internet of 2001-2003 seems unlikely, it is highly probable that we will have a structurally similar shake-down and that just one or two more Yahoo!(s) or Google(s) will crop up, having found the holy grail of

on-demand fully trackable horizontal niche long tail CPA advertising

By the way, addressing that advertising market will also have to overcome a formidable opponent which is very well positioned to address the long-tail of advertising, and that is Google.

My point in this Blog post is that there have to be, and there will be business models beyond advertising and they are starting to emerge. Essentially these will be transaction based and will be centered either around the handling of goods in an e-commerce sense (that is already being seen in a number of start-ups) for example, by itravel, but there will also more and more be transaction platforms centered around services, much in the sourcing logic mentioned above.

The sum of these developments is what I call “viral social commerce”. It is viral in the sense that its dynamics of growth/expansion are very much word-of-mouth and very much based on the social phenomena of Web 2.0.

*I might add, that these phenomena are not new, word-of-mouth has always been the most powerful marketing instrument, it’s just that technology has enabled it to travel at light-speed, where before it was at a horse carriage pace.

It is social in the sense that, not only communication, but also increasingly parts of the production process and the definition of the product/service offered will be defined not by an entity that is producing it, but rather by a group of people or a community that adds a significant part of the value that is being created. An example for that is again itravel, where the travel community creates a lot of the product knowledge and even product sourcing that is necessary to create its catalogue of once-in-a-lifetime-experiences. Another example is ChariTees, where the community sources not only the designs, but also decides which designs will appear on t-shirts and also decides which institution would benefit from that part of the proceeds of ChariTees that is being spent on charity.

The commerce part of the “viral social commerce” idiom, reflects on what I was describing at the beginning of my post, namely that this is more than a social communication phenomenon and it is also more than pure interaction, it is in essence a whole new commercial dimension to what happens in our increasingly web-enabled society.

Viral social commerce is, for me, the essence of what will happen with Web 3.0. In my next post, I will describe how companies can confront this development and attain competitive advantages by harnessing them.

The YouTube Problem

As the winter of discontent of content owners and YouTube begins, a certain rumbling is growing. If you look back at the first Blog posts describing the Web 2.0 phenomenon, they often called it an illusion, overrated or a bubble. Very often it is pointed out that while YouTube was sold for $1.6 Billion, it in effect only had $15 Million in revenue last year and now a host of other problems (if you count all litigation issues and tech issues, the costs of YouTube may well be above $1 Billion or so). That is assuming, of course, that Viacom and Co. will manage to convince the courts of their point of view.

However exaggerated this view may be – it has, on a fundamental level, one merit. The YouTube Business Model, as far as it is now established, is based on an unjust usage of copyright and the equity of copyright.

Now I would be the first proponent of the theory that the internet, as John Perry Barlow put it, is “the end of copyright”. In the sense that transmitting, copying and distributing knowledge and information has become so easy through the internet that an author who wants to earn the fruits of his labor is well advised to find new ways of establishing himself as a person and establishing derivative business models off the content he produces, rather than relying on licensing fees alone. Nevertheless, YouTube does not even give that to content producers and content owners. It is like a giant attention lottery, where the very few motivate the very many, through their success stories of 15 minute world fame, to copy their endeavour and try to achieve that kind of world wide recognition. However, who of those authors, even of those who have achieved that kind of short-lived fame, has actually managed to earn money off it?

That is why YouTube lacks the value chain one needs for a viable business model. That is not to say that YouTube did not achieve something very important. It created a platform for ubiquity of video content and facilitated the exchange, commenting and sharing of that kind of content. It taught users an important lesson- that broadcasting is not the prerogative of a few publishers. From there, to a viable business model is a different step.

Google may use the YouTube technology to create Google video ads and to create a platform for viral marketing (which actually may be a sound business from the position that Google has) but, anyone trying to copy the YouTube model must fail if he does not devise a value chain, a sound and profitable value argumentation, and defines what his market is.

In essence, the markets the emerging video platforms target is the advertising market or the market for sharing and licensing content- the latter being a very difficult one. The key to monetizing that kind of tool and achieving success in that kind of market will be to define the value chain and to make it track-able, so as to be able to calculate an operating margin and to devise ways of building a business.

None of the me too(s) and copycat models of YouTube has achieved that yet.

None, except one- sevenload.

sevenload is one of the most exciting business ventures I have ever been a part of, by defining a value chain which, because of its self-reinforcing nature, we call the “value mill”. By devising a technology to track not only usage of content, but also the revenue generated by the individual video stream and by devising a way to create specific audiences that add a lot to the advertising value that a video can have, sevenload has in effect solved the 3 main problems of any video business model.

For now I don’t want to describe, in too much detail, what sevenload does as we still have to establish our market leadership. But stay tuned to see how the first viable video business model on the net will continue to be established.

Sevenload Gets Financed and a Lesson in PR

After having gone underground with a series of negotiations, I’m back withe the facts and some insights:

- Sevenload ( got a Financing from Burda Digital Ventures, the venture subsidiary of Burda group, a leading German Media Group

- Oneview ( got a financing from a leading Media group as well, but that is still somewhat in stealth mode.

This introduces an exciting new phase in both ventures. Sevenload has reached new highs in usage. While competitors benefit from integration in TV channels, tend to trick somewhat on their figures, and basically are positioned as “videos generate traffic, traffic generates advertising impressions, ad impressions generate revenue”, sevenload is going for the Long Tail of content, creating a series of specialised audiences and trying to create advertising value there.

We have negotiated for months on the financing deal with a series of Venture Capitalists and strategic investors. We opted for Burda because it gave us a combination of media competence on their part and independence to pursue our own entrepreneurial course.

We closed the deal more than three weeks ago but wanted to gain some time before communicating it. We had carefully crafted a press release – only to discover that an early talk and its misinterpretation has led, a day before the release, to the faulty and undesired headline that we had been acquired. While this certainly serves the purpose of strengthening the positioning of Burda as a digital innovation leader, it is important for us to stress that we remain entirely independent and this is a pure venture financing. Lesson learned: remain on top of any and all first contacts to the press and lock in the main media with exclusives.

The other surprise was that the news generated so much response. The video market remains a very hot spot.

Videos and More

The world is abuzz with the changes spurred by the (third) arrival of video to the internet. There is truth in the perception, but many questions are unanswered by the hype.

The way we see it, three factors will create the actual value of video on the web:

1) ubiquity: it will evolve from a feature to a standard component of every website
2) involvement /interactivity: the business models that will succeed are those that combine the emotional appeal of moving pictures with a wide and differentiated range of interests reflecting long tail segments which in their combination reflect any given markets population diversity
3) cannibalization of existing markets: there is still no new money out there, so startups have to decide who’s pockets they’re after. The Advertising World? Media Budgets? B2C Entertainment? E-Commerce -> Retail? That is the Gretchenfrage.

Incidentally, that’s the exciting part of

the board of which I just joined. they will beat YouTube in Europe, not as a copy. Al Ries in “The Origin of Brands”:

“If you want to beat the incumbent, you have to be the enemy of the incumbent”

So be it.

VCs are sooooo cyclical

Rumour has it VCs are downbeat again. Well, on the one hand I can’t blame them, and on the other it brings me back the structural problem of assessing innovation as an investor. I have been observing a very fashion-driven, impressionable and cyclical focus of VCs on The Things That Exit Well (TTTEW), coupled with a regularly disdainful disregard of Never Heard of That (NHoT) and Don’t Believe It Works (DBIW).

Interestingly, most acclaimed hot shots, like skype, or Social Bookmarking, or even Apple in the beginning, went through year-long phases of NHoT and DBIW before sparking real Oh God I Hope We’ll Get a Deal in That Space Epidemic (OGIHWGaDiTSE).

Now as a proponent of a few Startups That Earn Actual Money (STEAM) – I like to think of our company as having a STEAM-Engine, being STEAM-Driven, or believing in STEAM-Power, if that is not too much self-E-STEAM – I keep wondering why it is much harder for VCs to see the merits of Social Commerce models vs. simple Social Network models.

There is no logical explanation for this. And if you think of it, copying something that just exited well is about the stupidest thing you can do:

1. It has already been done
2. It has become big enough to just exit
3. It has become so big everybody actually knows about it
4. There are at least 100 other boy group founding teams and greedy-panicky Vijays (see Dilbert for who that is) funding them who are trying to do the latest GooTube thing

…doesn’t strike you as smart? It’s being done. All the time. Again. And it’s sooo 1990s, ain’t it?

So, dear entrepreneurs, stick to your guns on real innovation, don’t foray into the OGIHWGaDiTSE, avoid the Vijays, and remember MIT’s secret formula for success, as transmitted by Prof. Ken Morse:


(Cash Flow is More Important Than your Mother)



PS: I’m known for being a real Punster…

Is the Tide turning?

Exit phantasies, commercialisation discussion, is blogging worth the trouble – there are many signs that euphoria and passion, the web 2.0 sense of mission etc.. are giving way to the same kind of frenetic and less frenetic division of the spoils that we had in 2000.

That holds an important lesson for all entrepreneurs, especially since this time around, there will be no big bust – just failures and successes distributed along the bell curve.

Lesson #1:
Even if everyone is focussing on other metrics, make sure you’re earning money. It’s better to be smaller and profitable, i.e. independent, than growing and growing and going nowhere in terms of being a viable business.

MIT’s secret formula for success is CFIMITYM (Cash Flow is More Important Than Your Mother) – brutal, but to the point.

Lesson #2:
Focus on proving the business model, or, more likely, finding it in the first place. chances are, that gets you more and stickier users than pure play community building. Business Models tend to evolve where there is long term value.

Lesson #3:
Try to identify the basic need you are adressing – the more basic it is, the more chances you have. Poeple have eaten, slept, mated, vyed for attention and recognition, thirsted for knowledge etc.. for centuries… that’s where the money is.

Lesson #4
Look for the right people. Rotten Ideas have made it because of world class teams. And be honest to yourself about your won ability. Your abilities do not expand as you grow older, they diminish and gnarl like old roots. That makes you experienced and savvy in your field of expertise – and less and less of a generalist in others. Get Good people. Kennedy did (“A good manager hires better staff than he is”).

When the going gets tough, the tough get going…

Back to Top